Difference between revisions of "Egypt NGO Sector"
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| − | == | + | ===Introduction=== |
| − | Civil associations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) not only provide social and cultural services to a community, but they can also serve as instruments for democratic development. For this reason, in authoritarian states NGOs are generally controlled by the government to prevent them from becoming focal points of political reform. Along these lines, in Egypt, where political power is held almost exclusively by the president, NGOs are subject to substantial government interference. Despite this interference, in recent years the Egyptian NGO sector, while continuing to provide a variety of community services, has begun to serve as an outlet for those seeking social and political change. However, to make an impact on the development of Egyptian society NGOs must overcome a difficult political and social environment, legal and funding restrictions, and extra-legal barriers to registering and operating an NGO. | + | Civil associations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) not only provide social and cultural services to a community, but they can also serve as instruments for democratic development. For this reason, in authoritarian states NGOs are generally controlled by the government to prevent them from becoming focal points of political reform. Along these lines, in Egypt, where political power is held almost exclusively by the president, NGOs are subject to substantial government interference. Despite this interference, in recent years the Egyptian NGO sector, while continuing to provide a variety of community services, has begun to serve as an outlet for those seeking social and political change. However, to make an impact on the development of Egyptian society NGOs must overcome a difficult political and social environment, legal and funding restrictions, and extra-legal barriers to registering and operating an NGO. <membersonly> |
| − | + | ||
| − | == | + | ===Egyptian NGOs=== |
Since the early 20th century, NGOs have been an integral part of Egyptian civil society in providing social aid and services to the community. Egypt’s early NGOs arose as ethnic and religious organizations. In particular, Islamic NGOs have long been an important part of Egypt’s charitable system. In the last two decades, the numbers of all types of NGOs have increased with corresponding growth in the diversity and scope of their activities, the amount of funds they receive and distribute, and their impact on society. According to the Egyptian government, there are approximately 17,000 NGOs registered and operating in the country. The NGO community consists mostly of “small community-based organizations that concentrate on service delivery and social assistance.” NGOs in Egypt work in many fields, including “health care, education, job training, child care, elder care, welfare, legal assistance, human rights, access to credit (especially for women), water, irrigation, environmental and other social and economic services to a largely poor population.” | Since the early 20th century, NGOs have been an integral part of Egyptian civil society in providing social aid and services to the community. Egypt’s early NGOs arose as ethnic and religious organizations. In particular, Islamic NGOs have long been an important part of Egypt’s charitable system. In the last two decades, the numbers of all types of NGOs have increased with corresponding growth in the diversity and scope of their activities, the amount of funds they receive and distribute, and their impact on society. According to the Egyptian government, there are approximately 17,000 NGOs registered and operating in the country. The NGO community consists mostly of “small community-based organizations that concentrate on service delivery and social assistance.” NGOs in Egypt work in many fields, including “health care, education, job training, child care, elder care, welfare, legal assistance, human rights, access to credit (especially for women), water, irrigation, environmental and other social and economic services to a largely poor population.” | ||
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In Egypt, NGOs can generally be categorized into five major groups: development organizations, Islamic NGOs, advocacy groups, Coptic NGOs, and business associations. Development organizations are connected to the government and provide social welfare services. Islamic NGOs are the “most active and well-organized,” and are best able to obtain funds, from individuals and other Muslim countries, and recruit qualified professionals. With the widest popular base of NGOs in Egypt, Islamic NGOs provide a variety of services, including health and education services. Advocacy groups include human rights, environmental and some women’s rights groups. Rather than providing community services, advocacy groups focus on exposing matters of public policy and pushing the government for social and political reform. Even though advocacy groups have grown in number in recent years, they still make up a small percentage of NGOs and are dependent on foreign funds. Coptic NGOs consist of some of the largest NGOs in Egypt, but are also small in number and dependent on donations from the West. Like Islamic NGOs, Coptic NGOs have been noted for their contributions to health and education. Business associations, although treated like NGOs under the law, are really interest groups and do not serve the “community at large” like other types of NGOs. Excluding the first and last category, the growth of these NGOs in number and impact has increased the tension between the NGO community and Egypt’s authoritarian government and within the NGO community itself. | In Egypt, NGOs can generally be categorized into five major groups: development organizations, Islamic NGOs, advocacy groups, Coptic NGOs, and business associations. Development organizations are connected to the government and provide social welfare services. Islamic NGOs are the “most active and well-organized,” and are best able to obtain funds, from individuals and other Muslim countries, and recruit qualified professionals. With the widest popular base of NGOs in Egypt, Islamic NGOs provide a variety of services, including health and education services. Advocacy groups include human rights, environmental and some women’s rights groups. Rather than providing community services, advocacy groups focus on exposing matters of public policy and pushing the government for social and political reform. Even though advocacy groups have grown in number in recent years, they still make up a small percentage of NGOs and are dependent on foreign funds. Coptic NGOs consist of some of the largest NGOs in Egypt, but are also small in number and dependent on donations from the West. Like Islamic NGOs, Coptic NGOs have been noted for their contributions to health and education. Business associations, although treated like NGOs under the law, are really interest groups and do not serve the “community at large” like other types of NGOs. Excluding the first and last category, the growth of these NGOs in number and impact has increased the tension between the NGO community and Egypt’s authoritarian government and within the NGO community itself. | ||
| − | == | + | ===Political & Social Environment=== |
To operate, NGOs must navigate through the political and social environment of Egypt. The Arab Republic of Egypt, while nominally governed by three separate branches of government, is in practice controlled by the President who maintains a tight authoritarian grip over political and social society. Since 1981, following an increase in sectarian violence and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak has ruled Egypt under a state of emergency, which ostensibly gives the President military control over the country. The emergency laws restrict basic rights; prohibit public meetings, strikes and demonstrations; allow political activists to be tried in military courts; and censor the media on the basis of national security. While the rights of freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration are guaranteed under the Egyptian Constitution, the Gathering Law, an emergency regulation, requires notice to be given to security forces prior to any public meetings and gives police the right to prevent or dissolve meetings by force “if necessary.” | To operate, NGOs must navigate through the political and social environment of Egypt. The Arab Republic of Egypt, while nominally governed by three separate branches of government, is in practice controlled by the President who maintains a tight authoritarian grip over political and social society. Since 1981, following an increase in sectarian violence and the assassination of President Anwar Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak has ruled Egypt under a state of emergency, which ostensibly gives the President military control over the country. The emergency laws restrict basic rights; prohibit public meetings, strikes and demonstrations; allow political activists to be tried in military courts; and censor the media on the basis of national security. While the rights of freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration are guaranteed under the Egyptian Constitution, the Gathering Law, an emergency regulation, requires notice to be given to security forces prior to any public meetings and gives police the right to prevent or dissolve meetings by force “if necessary.” | ||
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Within the NGO community itself, experts believe that government interference and NGO dependence on foreign funds produces competition for survival and a lack of pluralism among [NGOs]. In addition, there has been increasing division and hostility between Islamic and secular NGOs over their different visions of a desirable society. This has led to more members of the community identifying only with the NGOs that share their religious or ethnic background. According to a study of NGOs in Egypt, this struggle for survival [within the political and social atmosphere] diverts the attention of NGOs from their actual objectives. | Within the NGO community itself, experts believe that government interference and NGO dependence on foreign funds produces competition for survival and a lack of pluralism among [NGOs]. In addition, there has been increasing division and hostility between Islamic and secular NGOs over their different visions of a desirable society. This has led to more members of the community identifying only with the NGOs that share their religious or ethnic background. According to a study of NGOs in Egypt, this struggle for survival [within the political and social atmosphere] diverts the attention of NGOs from their actual objectives. | ||
| − | == | + | ===Legal Framework=== |
The rights of Egyptians to private assembly, to associate, and to create syndicates and unions is guaranteed in the Constitution of Egypt. The Constitution also protects basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, and literary and scientific research. NGOs and their activities in Egypt are governed by Law No. 84 of the Year 2002 on Non-Governmental Organizations (“Law 84/2002”), and the related Executive Statute on Law No. 84 of 2002 (Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree No. 178 of 2002). NGOs must register with and are regulated by the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA). | The rights of Egyptians to private assembly, to associate, and to create syndicates and unions is guaranteed in the Constitution of Egypt. The Constitution also protects basic freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, and literary and scientific research. NGOs and their activities in Egypt are governed by Law No. 84 of the Year 2002 on Non-Governmental Organizations (“Law 84/2002”), and the related Executive Statute on Law No. 84 of 2002 (Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree No. 178 of 2002). NGOs must register with and are regulated by the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MISA). | ||
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Under Law 84/2002, direct authority over NGOs and their activities was transferred from the courts to the MISA. Within the law the basis for the government’s power over the NGO community resides in two main areas: (1) the ability of the MISA to select NGO leaders and (2) the MISA’s control of the financial resources available to NGOs. MISA’s financial monitoring takes “three forms: (1) directly supervis[ing ]NGOs’ budgets and expenditures, (2) allocat[ing ]government grants, and (3) control[ling] foreign funding.” The law also gives the state new powers to reject the registration of NGOs, dissolve existing NGOS, and monitor activities. In addition, Law 84/2002 contains an Article 11, similar to Law 153/1999, prohibiting political activity. | Under Law 84/2002, direct authority over NGOs and their activities was transferred from the courts to the MISA. Within the law the basis for the government’s power over the NGO community resides in two main areas: (1) the ability of the MISA to select NGO leaders and (2) the MISA’s control of the financial resources available to NGOs. MISA’s financial monitoring takes “three forms: (1) directly supervis[ing ]NGOs’ budgets and expenditures, (2) allocat[ing ]government grants, and (3) control[ling] foreign funding.” The law also gives the state new powers to reject the registration of NGOs, dissolve existing NGOS, and monitor activities. In addition, Law 84/2002 contains an Article 11, similar to Law 153/1999, prohibiting political activity. | ||
| − | ==Registration of NGOs== | + | ===Registration of NGOs=== |
Under Law 84/2002, NGO registration is mandatory. Unregistered NGOs are prohibited. The law divides NGOs into two types: (1) associations and (2) non-governmental private institutions or foundations. Once an NGO is registered it receives an official registration number. | Under Law 84/2002, NGO registration is mandatory. Unregistered NGOs are prohibited. The law divides NGOs into two types: (1) associations and (2) non-governmental private institutions or foundations. Once an NGO is registered it receives an official registration number. | ||
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| − | ==Application Review Process== | + | ===Application Review Process=== |
The MISA is required to record the date the application is submitted and return a copy to the applicants. The name of the NGO must then be checked to make sure it is not already being used. After the submission of its registration papers, an NGO’s premises must be inspected. After inspection, the founders must review the application with an MISA official who will instruct the applicants on any objections the MISA has to the application or the articles of incorporation. Objections to the articles of incorporation must be in writing. If the NGO does not make requested changes, the matter will go before a three-person dispute resolution committee. | The MISA is required to record the date the application is submitted and return a copy to the applicants. The name of the NGO must then be checked to make sure it is not already being used. After the submission of its registration papers, an NGO’s premises must be inspected. After inspection, the founders must review the application with an MISA official who will instruct the applicants on any objections the MISA has to the application or the articles of incorporation. Objections to the articles of incorporation must be in writing. If the NGO does not make requested changes, the matter will go before a three-person dispute resolution committee. | ||
| − | ===Grounds for Rejection of Application=== | + | ====Grounds for Rejection of Application==== |
The MISA can reject an application if it finds the application violates Article 11 of Law 84/2002. Under Article 11, an NGO may not: | The MISA can reject an application if it finds the application violates Article 11 of Law 84/2002. Under Article 11, an NGO may not: | ||
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Law 84/2002 also established the General Union of Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions (General Union) in Cairo (similar to Jordan’s “General Union of Voluntary Associations”), a government organized representative body for all NGOs in Egypt. The General Union consists of elected members from Egypt’s NGOs and its duties include, setting a general role for NGOs, helping NGOs develop financial resources, and reorganizing training programs for NGO employees. The board of directors of the General Union is made up of 30 members: 19 members elected from NGOs and 11 members, including the chairman, appointed by the President of Egypt. One of the General Union members sits on the three-person dispute resolution committee established to hear complaints between the MISA and NGOs. General Union representatives must also be consulted by the government on certain occasions, such as the government-ordered dissolution of an NGO or the appointment of a board member. | Law 84/2002 also established the General Union of Associations and Non-Governmental Institutions (General Union) in Cairo (similar to Jordan’s “General Union of Voluntary Associations”), a government organized representative body for all NGOs in Egypt. The General Union consists of elected members from Egypt’s NGOs and its duties include, setting a general role for NGOs, helping NGOs develop financial resources, and reorganizing training programs for NGO employees. The board of directors of the General Union is made up of 30 members: 19 members elected from NGOs and 11 members, including the chairman, appointed by the President of Egypt. One of the General Union members sits on the three-person dispute resolution committee established to hear complaints between the MISA and NGOs. General Union representatives must also be consulted by the government on certain occasions, such as the government-ordered dissolution of an NGO or the appointment of a board member. | ||
| − | ==Organization of NGOs According to Law== | + | ===Organization of NGOs According to Law=== |
In general, an NGO is governed by a board of directors or trustees. Law 84/2002 specifies the organizational framework for the governing bodies of NGOs in Egypt. Particularly, the MISA has the power to determine the makeup of an NGO’s board. | In general, an NGO is governed by a board of directors or trustees. Law 84/2002 specifies the organizational framework for the governing bodies of NGOs in Egypt. Particularly, the MISA has the power to determine the makeup of an NGO’s board. | ||
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#the procedures for keeping records at the association’s place of business. | #the procedures for keeping records at the association’s place of business. | ||
| − | ==Meeting Procedures== | + | ===Meeting Procedures=== |
The board of directors of an association must call an annual general meeting (AGM) of the general assembly to consider the NGO’s balance sheet, the final accounts, the board’s report for the year’s work, and the auditor’s report, as well as to elect the board and discuss other issues. For a decision to be made at the AGM, for example approval of the budget, a majority of the members present must vote for it. A copy of the minutes of the AGM must be submitted to the MISA within 30 days of the meeting. The MISA may convene an AGM if it deems it necessary. | The board of directors of an association must call an annual general meeting (AGM) of the general assembly to consider the NGO’s balance sheet, the final accounts, the board’s report for the year’s work, and the auditor’s report, as well as to elect the board and discuss other issues. For a decision to be made at the AGM, for example approval of the budget, a majority of the members present must vote for it. A copy of the minutes of the AGM must be submitted to the MISA within 30 days of the meeting. The MISA may convene an AGM if it deems it necessary. | ||
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The MISA has 30 days from notification to approve the merger. | The MISA has 30 days from notification to approve the merger. | ||
| − | ==Dissolution of NGOs According to Law== | + | ===Dissolution of NGOs According to Law=== |
Under Law 84/2002, the MISA can dissolve an NGO any time it finds that the organization is performing an illegal activity. A dissolution order is appealable to the administrative court. | Under Law 84/2002, the MISA can dissolve an NGO any time it finds that the organization is performing an illegal activity. A dissolution order is appealable to the administrative court. | ||
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Associations may receive domestic donations, that is, donations from natural persons, either Egyptians or foreign nationals, in Egypt. To receive a domestic donation, the NGO must notify the MISA of the source and value of the donation. Alternatively, associations cannot receive foreign funding or send funds abroad without MISA approval. For every foreign grant an NGO must submit a request for approval with the MISA containing the name, country, and head office of the foreign donor; the activity and purpose for the funding; and the amount of the donation. The MISA must provide a decision within 60 days. If a foreign donation is received prior to approval, the funds must be reserved in a special account, which cannot be accessed until approval. However, NGOs may receive foreign funds if the foreign donor has an agreement with the MFA and the MISA is notified first. For both domestic and foreign grants, an association must deposit its funds in a bank and can only spend the money on realizing the NGO’s purpose. The association may invest its funds, but it cannot speculate with the funds. | Associations may receive domestic donations, that is, donations from natural persons, either Egyptians or foreign nationals, in Egypt. To receive a domestic donation, the NGO must notify the MISA of the source and value of the donation. Alternatively, associations cannot receive foreign funding or send funds abroad without MISA approval. For every foreign grant an NGO must submit a request for approval with the MISA containing the name, country, and head office of the foreign donor; the activity and purpose for the funding; and the amount of the donation. The MISA must provide a decision within 60 days. If a foreign donation is received prior to approval, the funds must be reserved in a special account, which cannot be accessed until approval. However, NGOs may receive foreign funds if the foreign donor has an agreement with the MFA and the MISA is notified first. For both domestic and foreign grants, an association must deposit its funds in a bank and can only spend the money on realizing the NGO’s purpose. The association may invest its funds, but it cannot speculate with the funds. | ||
| − | ==Fundraising== | + | ===Fundraising=== |
An association may engage in fundraising activities if the NGO receives prior approval from the MISA. To request approval the association has to submit a request to the MISA detailing the activity, method, time period, and location of the fundraising. The MISA has 15 days to provide a decision. If the MISA approves of the fundraising, the NGO must submit its receipts to the MISA for endorsement. In its authorization, the MISA will provide the time period, location, and number of receipts allowed for the fundraising activity. The NGO must submit its final accounting to the MISA within 60 days from the end of the fundraising period. | An association may engage in fundraising activities if the NGO receives prior approval from the MISA. To request approval the association has to submit a request to the MISA detailing the activity, method, time period, and location of the fundraising. The MISA has 15 days to provide a decision. If the MISA approves of the fundraising, the NGO must submit its receipts to the MISA for endorsement. In its authorization, the MISA will provide the time period, location, and number of receipts allowed for the fundraising activity. The NGO must submit its final accounting to the MISA within 60 days from the end of the fundraising period. | ||
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Registered NGOs in Egypt are generally exempt from most taxes and receive reduced utility rates. Under the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, income tax-exempt entities include non-profit educational establishments, NGOs established according to Law 84/2002, and non-profit entities exercising social, scientific, sports or cultural activities. NGOs are also exempt from registration and booking fees, stamp taxes, custom duties, and real estate taxes, and they receive a 25% discount on railway shipments. Further, NGOs registered under Law 84/2002 receive reduced charges for telephone, water, electric, and gas utilities. As for charitable donations, donations that do not exceed 10% of the donor’s net profit or income, which are given to registered NGOs, educational institutions, hospitals, and scientific research institutions, are deductible. | Registered NGOs in Egypt are generally exempt from most taxes and receive reduced utility rates. Under the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, income tax-exempt entities include non-profit educational establishments, NGOs established according to Law 84/2002, and non-profit entities exercising social, scientific, sports or cultural activities. NGOs are also exempt from registration and booking fees, stamp taxes, custom duties, and real estate taxes, and they receive a 25% discount on railway shipments. Further, NGOs registered under Law 84/2002 receive reduced charges for telephone, water, electric, and gas utilities. As for charitable donations, donations that do not exceed 10% of the donor’s net profit or income, which are given to registered NGOs, educational institutions, hospitals, and scientific research institutions, are deductible. | ||
| − | == | + | ===Barriers To Practice=== |
Beyond the legal requirements there are several practical obstacles that Egyptian NGOs experience in the management and operation of their organizations. The most significant is the reported activity of the security services in Egypt rejecting applications, vetoing board decisions, and investigating leaders. Another considerable challenge is the Egyptian bureaucracy, which under Law 84/2002, has the power to interfere in the internal decisions of an NGO. In addition, MISA bureaucrats and governorate administrations have reportedly applied the law arbitrarily and interpreted vague provisions against NGOs. Moreover, as with many bureaucracies, inefficiency and corruption further encumbers NGO registration and operation. For years the judiciary in Egypt has been the traditional protector of NGOs against this government intrusion; however, the courts have also become vulnerable to government hegemony. These difficulties lead many NGOs to eschew operating in an open and accountable manner, which undermines the public support that they need to persevere. | Beyond the legal requirements there are several practical obstacles that Egyptian NGOs experience in the management and operation of their organizations. The most significant is the reported activity of the security services in Egypt rejecting applications, vetoing board decisions, and investigating leaders. Another considerable challenge is the Egyptian bureaucracy, which under Law 84/2002, has the power to interfere in the internal decisions of an NGO. In addition, MISA bureaucrats and governorate administrations have reportedly applied the law arbitrarily and interpreted vague provisions against NGOs. Moreover, as with many bureaucracies, inefficiency and corruption further encumbers NGO registration and operation. For years the judiciary in Egypt has been the traditional protector of NGOs against this government intrusion; however, the courts have also become vulnerable to government hegemony. These difficulties lead many NGOs to eschew operating in an open and accountable manner, which undermines the public support that they need to persevere. | ||
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In the past, Egyptian courts have been the main protector for the NGO community against security intervention and government intrusion. Under the courts’ decisions favoring democratic reform, with which the government has complied, NGOs have been allowed to emerge and grow, and activists have had an “institutional opening” to challenge the government and its regulations. However, in recent years the government has sought to neutralize the judiciary’s ability to protect NGOs from government interference by choosing a Chief Justice who is a close ally of the President and attempting to restructure the court to lessen the judiciary’s independence and its ability “to confront executive abuses of power.” More recently, Egypt’s judges have clashed with the government over these attempts to diminish their autonomy by staging demonstrations and sit-ins. In response, the government included, among the constitutional amendments passed in early 2007, an article severely reducing the judiciary’s role in monitoring elections. If the Egyptian government succeeds in dominating the judiciary, NGOs will lose one of their few protective shields. | In the past, Egyptian courts have been the main protector for the NGO community against security intervention and government intrusion. Under the courts’ decisions favoring democratic reform, with which the government has complied, NGOs have been allowed to emerge and grow, and activists have had an “institutional opening” to challenge the government and its regulations. However, in recent years the government has sought to neutralize the judiciary’s ability to protect NGOs from government interference by choosing a Chief Justice who is a close ally of the President and attempting to restructure the court to lessen the judiciary’s independence and its ability “to confront executive abuses of power.” More recently, Egypt’s judges have clashed with the government over these attempts to diminish their autonomy by staging demonstrations and sit-ins. In response, the government included, among the constitutional amendments passed in early 2007, an article severely reducing the judiciary’s role in monitoring elections. If the Egyptian government succeeds in dominating the judiciary, NGOs will lose one of their few protective shields. | ||
NGO Accountability | NGO Accountability | ||
| + | |||
The political, legal, and social environment in Egypt for NGOs creates a circular detrimental effect on NGO accountability: NGOs are treated with suspicion which leads them to behave in ways that seem to prove that NGOs cannot be trusted. Specifically, reports indicate that the government’s wide power to directly interfere within an NGO and the fear of retribution for failing to predict how the MISA will apply the law hinders transparency and accountability and promotes “self-censorship and uncertainty” within the NGO community. Many NGOs choose to censor themselves and avoid work in political or social advocacy which attracts government attention. Other NGOs attempt to circumvent the law by, for example, accepting money from donors in ways that hides the funds from government scrutiny. Observers have found that the restrictive and undemocratic environment also promotes an internal NGO organization that is also undemocratic, namely lacking interaction between the NGO and its beneficiaries, concentrating decision-making in a few hands, and disregarding systems of internal accountability. Lack of transparency and confidence in the management of NGOs undermines public trust, which makes garnering support within society for NGO autonomy more difficult. | The political, legal, and social environment in Egypt for NGOs creates a circular detrimental effect on NGO accountability: NGOs are treated with suspicion which leads them to behave in ways that seem to prove that NGOs cannot be trusted. Specifically, reports indicate that the government’s wide power to directly interfere within an NGO and the fear of retribution for failing to predict how the MISA will apply the law hinders transparency and accountability and promotes “self-censorship and uncertainty” within the NGO community. Many NGOs choose to censor themselves and avoid work in political or social advocacy which attracts government attention. Other NGOs attempt to circumvent the law by, for example, accepting money from donors in ways that hides the funds from government scrutiny. Observers have found that the restrictive and undemocratic environment also promotes an internal NGO organization that is also undemocratic, namely lacking interaction between the NGO and its beneficiaries, concentrating decision-making in a few hands, and disregarding systems of internal accountability. Lack of transparency and confidence in the management of NGOs undermines public trust, which makes garnering support within society for NGO autonomy more difficult. | ||
| − | == | + | ===Conclusion=== |
Egyptian NGOs must overcome the difficult political, social, and legal environment, and the practical barriers to operating a non-profit organization in Egypt if they are to play a role in the democratic development of Egypt. Egyptian NGOs have long provided social services and aid to their communities, and in modern times have moved into political and social advocacy. Since then, the Egyptian government has regarded the NGO community as a potential threat to its exclusive control of the state and sought to weaken groups that it disfavored. To maintain a tight control over NGOs, the Egyptian government has used the law to limit the organizational and financial options open to NGOs and keep a hand in any internal decisions of governance and administration made by an NGO. Additionally, interference by the security services, a cumbersome and difficult bureaucracy, a weakened judiciary, and a lack of public accountability have lessened the impact NGOs have had on improving the Egyptian political culture. However, while the immediate future for NGOs in Egypt looks dark, NGOs continue to be one of the few instruments available to Egyptians to advance reform, thus, there is little choice for NGOs but to continue to find ways to do their work within and without the system and hope for brighter days ahead. | Egyptian NGOs must overcome the difficult political, social, and legal environment, and the practical barriers to operating a non-profit organization in Egypt if they are to play a role in the democratic development of Egypt. Egyptian NGOs have long provided social services and aid to their communities, and in modern times have moved into political and social advocacy. Since then, the Egyptian government has regarded the NGO community as a potential threat to its exclusive control of the state and sought to weaken groups that it disfavored. To maintain a tight control over NGOs, the Egyptian government has used the law to limit the organizational and financial options open to NGOs and keep a hand in any internal decisions of governance and administration made by an NGO. Additionally, interference by the security services, a cumbersome and difficult bureaucracy, a weakened judiciary, and a lack of public accountability have lessened the impact NGOs have had on improving the Egyptian political culture. However, while the immediate future for NGOs in Egypt looks dark, NGOs continue to be one of the few instruments available to Egyptians to advance reform, thus, there is little choice for NGOs but to continue to find ways to do their work within and without the system and hope for brighter days ahead. | ||
| − | == | + | ===References=== |
Abdelrahman, Maha M. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt. London, New York: Tauris Academic, 2004. | Abdelrahman, Maha M. Civil Society Exposed: The Politics of NGOs in Egypt. London, New York: Tauris Academic, 2004. | ||
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Moustafa, Tamir. “Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt.” Law and Social Inquiry, 28 (2003): 883-930. | Moustafa, Tamir. “Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt.” Law and Social Inquiry, 28 (2003): 883-930. | ||
| − | == | + | ===Statutes=== |
President’s Order on Law 84 of 2002(can be found at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/library/index/php). | President’s Order on Law 84 of 2002(can be found at http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/library/index/php). | ||
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| − | == | + | ===External Links=== |
| − | ===Government=== | + | ====Government==== |
Egypt Government Sites http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/info/directory.asp. | Egypt Government Sites http://www.egypt.gov.eg/english/info/directory.asp. | ||
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Egypt’s NGO Law 153/1999 http://www.ngolaw.org.eg/. | Egypt’s NGO Law 153/1999 http://www.ngolaw.org.eg/. | ||
| − | ===Other=== | + | ====Other==== |
Arab Network for NGOs http://shabakaegypt.org. | Arab Network for NGOs http://shabakaegypt.org. | ||
Latest revision as of 07:20, 17 July 2008
Contents
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Egyptian NGOs
- 3 Political & Social Environment
- 4 Legal Framework
- 5 Registration of NGOs
- 6 Application Review Process
- 7 Organization of NGOs According to Law
- 8 Meeting Procedures
- 9 Dissolution of NGOs According to Law
- 10 Fundraising
- 11 Barriers To Practice
- 12 Conclusion
- 13 References
- 14 Statutes
- 15 External Links
Introduction
Civil associations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) not only provide social and cultural services to a community, but they can also serve as instruments for democratic development. For this reason, in authoritarian states NGOs are generally controlled by the government to prevent them from becoming focal points of political reform. Along these lines, in Egypt, where political power is held almost exclusively by the president, NGOs are subject to substantial government interference. Despite this interference, in recent years the Egyptian NGO sector, while continuing to provide a variety of community services, has begun to serve as an outlet for those seeking social and political change. However, to make an impact on the development of Egyptian society NGOs must overcome a difficult political and social environment, legal and funding restrictions, and extra-legal barriers to registering and operating an NGO.
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